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ABSTRACT: At NE 10.4 1174b31–3 Aristotle illustrates his conception of the 
relationship between pleasure and activity with a puzzling image: pleasure is like ‘the 
bloom on those in their prime’.  Discussion of various passages from Plato and 
Xenophon shows that the choice of this image arises from Aristotle’s engagement with 
earlier Socratic discussions of pleasure and virtue, including Plato Philebus 53c–d, 
where Socrates wants to use the example to help to classify pleasures as ‘changes’ or 
‘comings-to-be’.  In his use of the image of the ‘bloom of youth’, Aristotle reinforces 
his correction of the Platonic metaphysical classification of pleasure. 
 
In Nicomachean Ethics 10.4 Aristotle illustrates what he takes to be the proper 
relationship between an activity and pleasure.  He uses an example taken from the 
common rhetoric of praise for beautiful male youths to help us to understand the 
precise relationship he has in mind.  He writes at 1174b31–3: 
τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' 
ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. 
Christopher Rowe translates as follows (in Broadie and Rowe 2002): 
Pleasure completes the activity, not in the way the disposition 
present in the subject completes it, but as a sort of supervenient end, 
like the bloom of manhood on those in their prime. 
This sentence is puzzling for various reasons.  It is puzzling because of the difficulty 
of understanding the claim in the first part of the sentence about the proper way in 
which pleasure completes or perfects (τελειοῖ) an activity.  We are told that pleasure 
does not complete an activity by being a ‘disposition present in the subject’ (ἡ ἕξις 
ἐνυπάρχουσα) but rather by being some kind of ‘supervenient end’ (ἐπιγινόμενόν τι 
τέλος).  But it is not particularly clear what either of these is nor, therefore, what the 
contrast is between them.  What is more, given the lexical relationship between the 
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terms used, there appears to be some relationship between the way pleasure completes 
or perfects the activity (τελειοῖ) and the kind of end (τέλος) that it is.  But if there is 
some such relationship, Aristotle does not clearly spell it out.
1
  The sentence is also 
puzzling because of the comparison it contains at the end.  The contrast between 
‘being a disposition present in the subject’ and being a ‘supervenient end’ is 
illustrated by likening the relationship between pleasure and activity to the 
relationship between some kind of physical disposition of those in their prime or 
particular phase of life and a beautiful appearance.  If Aristotle’s comparison is 
supposed to help us to understand the precise relationship in view between activity 
and pleasure, it is not obvious that it succeeds.  It is not obvious what the two relevant 
relata—the ‘bloom’ and the ‘being in one’s prime’—are and it is not clear how they 
are to be related to one another.  In that case, the comparison tends not to answer 
some important questions about the relationship between pleasure and activity but 
rather to provoke additional puzzlement.
2
 
Some of the subsequent discussion in book ten does shed more light on how 
Aristotle understands the relationship between pleasure and activity.  The immediate 
context for the comparison with the bloom of youth is an account of how an activity is 
complete or perfect (τελεία) when engaged in under ideal circumstances.  For 
example, seeing is teleia when the organ of sight is in the best condition and it is 
being trained on something that is the best kind of visual object (presumably, for 
humans, the most beautiful kind of visual object).  In those cases, the most pleasure 
arises from the activity (1174b14–1175a3).  And Aristotle goes on to explain how this 
understanding of pleasure and activity can help in other ways.  For example, in 10.5 
Aristotle shows how his account will make sense of the view that pleasures differ ‘in 
kind’ (τῷ εἴδει) from one another, since the activities similarly differ in kind 
                                                          
1
  The adjective teleios and its cognate verb are being used throughout NE 10.3–4 to cover both 
the notion of being ‘complete’ and being ‘perfect’; the core notion is of a completed goal or 
end-point (telos).  See Waanders (1983) esp. §204, 216. 
2
  For a helpful account (and criticism) of recent interpretations see Strohl (2011) 272–7, who 
goes on to offer his own view that, for Aristotle, pleasure is ‘an essential aspect of perfect 
activity of awareness’; it is (278) ‘simply the perfection of a perfect activity of awareness, the 
very perfection that is brought about by the good condition of the capacity activated and the 
fine object it is active in relation to’. 
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(1175a21–28).  He goes on to say that this relationship between activity and pleasure 
will allow him to explain why pleasure increases as the activity increases and, indeed, 
why increasing pleasure might encourage a more intensive engagement in an activity 
(1175a29–1175b1).  He then proceeds to discuss how some activities may impede 
others because of the intensity of the pleasures associated with them or by an 
activity’s ‘own’ pains.  At 1175b1–24, the notion that activities have their own proper 
(οἰκεῖαι) pleasures and pains, contrasted with pleasures and pains that are alien 
(ἀλλότριαι), is a further elaboration of the idea that each activity has a pleasure that 
differs from other pleasures as the activity differs from other activities; each activity is 
to be associated with its own proper pleasure: a pleasure which arises out of and 
completes or perfects the activity, encourages engagement in the activity and may 
discourage engagement in a competing activity.  This picture allows Aristotle to 
outline a set of distinctions between human pleasures and those of other species and, 
within human pleasures, between better and worse pleasures, associated with better 
and worse human activities (1175b24–1176a29).  This in turn allows him finally to 
secure his desired connection between some pleasures and natural and virtuous 
activity and therefore the conclusion that the life of virtuous activity will also be a 
very pleasant life. 
Nevertheless, the precise understanding of the first part of the sentence in 10.4 
remains controversial.  And for the most part I shall not say much more about it.  
Instead, I focus on the puzzling image in the hope that this might contribute to 
understanding the contrast Aristotle wants it to illustrate.  At the very least, 
consideration of various other related texts by Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle himself 
to which this image at 1174b31–3 is clearly related will suggest something of the 
cultural and philosophical background of Aristotle’s account.   
 
Boys and men 
 
The reference to ‘those in their prime’ is to males of an age young enough to be 
attractive erōmenoi, the ‘beloveds’ of older mature adult erastai in the standard 
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conceptualization of male homosexual couples found in textual and visual 
representations from classical Athens.
3
   
Some commentators have denied that this is the correct interpretation.  Their 
case rests principally on references elsewhere in Aristotle’s works to a person’s akmē 
being rather later than would be the age of a beautiful erōmenos.  A passage at 
Rhetoric 1390b9–11, for example, claims that the body reaches its peak (ἀκμάζει) 
between the ages of thirty and thirty-five and the soul at the age of forty-nine.
4
  
However, it is clear that other classical Athenian texts use terms such as ὡραῖος—the 
adjective from the term used by Aristotle—to refer to younger men, who are no longer 
boys (paides) but not yet mature men (andres); someone who is ὡραῖος—‘in season’ 
or ‘in bloom’—is certainly younger than thirty-five (see e.g Aeschines In Timarchum 
40–42, 126, cf. 155–7).  Although it is difficult to be sure of the likely age of someone 
for whom this would be the appropriate description, in part because we should 
probably not assume that the usual age for male puberty in Athens at the time was the 
same as in modern Western societies, this stage of life is regularly associated with the 
                                                          
3
  Clear erotic overtones in the analogy in NE 10.4 were detected by Michael of Ephesus, 
working in the twelfth century A.D.  When he comes to comment on NE 1174b31–3, he 
writes: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ὡραιότης ἐπιτερπέστερα τὰ ἀκμάζοντα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἡδύτερα ποιεῖ 
καὶ ποθεινότερα καὶ ἐρασμιώτερα ὁρᾶσθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ τὴν ἐνέργειαν μᾶλλον ἐφετὴν 
ἐργάζεται καὶ μᾶλλον αὐτῆς ἔχεσθαι ἡμᾶς διατίθησιν (In Nic. Eth. comm. 559.7–10 Heylbut).   
Note also the continuation of Michael’s account at 559.14–17.  For Michael, the connection 
between, on the one hand, pleasure and activity and, on the other hand, bloom and being in 
one’s prime, is stronger than a simple analogy since the bloom of youth is itself something 
that causes an intensification of desire for the beloved and pleasure in perceiving the beloved. 
4
  Hadreas (1997) surveys evidence from Aristotle’s biological works and concludes that the 
reference is not to youths at all.  Rather, he argues that in NE 10.4 Aristotle refers to men 
reaching their adult maturity and that this is in fact no simile at all, since Aristotle thinks it 
simply true that at that point an individual reaches the peak of their perfection.  Hadreas does 
not, however, mention NE 1157a1–12 (on which, see below).   Cf. Gauthier and Jolif (1970) 
ad loc. who insist that the phrase τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα should be rendered as: ‘... comme un 
homme en pleine force (l’akmè est la force de l’âge, non la jeunesse)’.  Bostock (2000) 156, 
agrees; so do Van Riel (2000) 57 and Wolfsdorf (2013) 130 n. 32.  Strohl (2011) 281 and n. 
32 is not convinced. 
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brief period at which a young man was showing the first signs of a beard.
5
  At the 
very beginning of Plato’s Protagoras (309a1–5), for example, a friend teases Socrates 
for still desiring Alcibiades although Alcibiades’ beard is already filling out by 
describing Socrates as ‘hunting after his [Alcibiades’] ὥρα’; Alcibiades is already a 
man (ἀνήρ).6  And at Alcibiades I 131d–e Socrates contrasts himself with the other 
lovers of Alcibiades.  They will leave Alcibiades now that his possessions—including 
his youthful beauty—are fading; Socrates will become more enamored of Alcibiades 
as Alcibiades—or, more precisely, his soul—blooms.7  This is marked as a rather 
idiosyncratic Socratic preference based on the idea that psychic maturity and beauty 
are the proper objects of erotic pursuit.  The more usual situation is confirmed by 
Republic 474d–e, where Socrates insists that a ‘lover of boys’, a philopais, will love 
all of those who are ‘in bloom’ (ἐν ὥρᾳ: 474d2, e4) regardless of their various 
individual differences of appearance.  Whatever the precise age of the objects of 
attraction here, they are being described both as being ‘in bloom’ and also being boys, 
paides.
8
 
 In other texts, ὥρα features as a marker of evident physical beauty and is 
sometimes noted as a potential distraction from proper virtuous pursuits.  Three 
passages from Xenophon illustrate this well.  First, when describing Eudaimonia, the 
goddess who competes with Aretē in Prodicus’ story of the choice of Heracles, 
Xenophon writes that she wore ‘a dress from which her ὥρα might particularly shine 
forth’ (ἐσθῆτα ἐξ ἧς ἂν μάλιστα ὥρα διαλάμποι, Memorabilia 2.1.22).  This is likely 
to mean that she is wearing something revealing or provocative; that would be 
perfectly fitting for the goddess who is trying to tempt Heracles to choose a life of 
pleasure and ease.  At the very least, it is likely that ὥρα here is meant to stand for her 
visual appeal and it is probable that this appeal is linked to pleasure, perhaps even 
sexual pleasure specifically.  What Eudaimonia (her opponent later calls her ‘Kakia’) 
                                                          
5
  For example, consider Pausanias’s coments at Plato Symposium 181d, discussed further 
below.  See also Davidson (2007) 68–98. 
6
  Denyer (2008) ad loc. compares Xen. An. 2.6.28 as an unusual case in which a beardless youth 
makes a bearded adult his paidika.   
7
  Note esp. 131e11: τὰ δὲ σὰ λήγει ὥρας, σὺ δ’ ἄρχῃ ἀνθεῖν. 
8
  Cf. Dissoi Logoi 2.2: αὐτίκα γὰρ παιδὶ ὡραίῳ ἐραστᾶι μὲν [χρηστῶι] χαρίζεσθαι καλόν, μὴ 
ἐραστᾶι δὲ [καλῷ] αἰσχρόν. 
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has to offer is immediately evident and, we are invited to imagine, would require very 
little effort to secure and enjoy.
9
   
  Second, at Memorabilia 1.6.11–12, Antiphon has noticed that Socrates does 
not charge for people to engage him in conversation.  He constructs a dilemma: either 
Socrates is honest or he is deceitful.  If Socrates is honest then he is not charging a fee 
for his conversations because he considers what he offers to be of no genuine worth.  
And so, if Socrates is honest then he cannot be wise.  But if he is wise and his 
conversation is worth something then he is not honest because he does not charge for 
it.  Socrates is therefore either wise or honest but cannot be both.  In response, 
Socrates draws an analogy between wisdom and physical beauty (ὥρα 1.6.13) since it 
is thought that both can be either fine or shameful.  Physical beauty is shameful if the 
beautiful person simply sells it, as a male prostitute (πόρνος) might, to anyone who 
wishes to pay for it.  But the same beauty is noble if someone should recognize it and 
become a fine and good erastēs as a result.  Indeed, we might even consider such a 
person to be virtuously self-controlled (σώφρων).  Similarly, wisdom is shameful if it 
is simply sold to any willing buyer—and therefore sophists are intellectual 
prostitutes—but it is a fine thing to teach wisdom without being paid; indeed it is a 
reason to think someone a fine and upstanding kind of person.  Again, there is a 
strong connection here between a particular form of physical beauty (ὥρα) and a 
youthful object of desire.  In addition, we find here a distinction between two possible 
reactions to this beauty on the part of the young man concerned and his lover.  The 
baser version sees the beauty as an opportunity for monetary gain on the part of the 
boy and sexual pleasure on the part of the lover.  The more elevated version sees the 
beauty as instigating a longer-term bond which is related to and may even cement 
certain virtuous traits in both the lover and his beloved.   
 Much the same point is made in a third passage.  Towards the end of 
Xenophon’s Symposium, Socrates is contrasting two distinct kinds of relationship: one 
in which the attachment between lover and beloved is based on an appreciation of 
goodness and virtuous character and another in which the lover is simply bent on 
gratifying his physical desires.  In this latter case, Socrates claims, the boy neither 
                                                          
9
  However, her appearance is the result of careful artifice.  Her skin, for example, has been 
made to look paler and healthier than it truly is (2.22).  Her allure, therefore, is both superficial 
and illusory and it contrasts sharply with the pure, chaste, and genuine elegance of her rival. 
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shares in a bond of erōs with his lover nor does he share sexual pleasure with the 
older lover, but instead he is merely selling his physical beauty (ὥρα) in the market 
place (Symposium 8.21). 
These passages come from Socratic texts in which discussions of the nature 
and use of this youthful beauty are used as means to consider more general ethical 
questions and, in particular, the relationship between pleasure and virtue: a 
relationship, of course, that Aristotle too is trying to explain at Nicomachean Ethics 
10.4.  In both the choice of Heracles and the discussion with Antiphon, Socrates 
distinguishes sharply between a reaction to physical youthful beauty that is concerned 
primarily with physical pleasure and sexual gain and an alternative preference for the 
cultivation of moral virtue.  In the choice of Heracles these initially appear to be stark 
alternatives, although later in the discussion Virtue makes the case for her being able 
also to provide for better or more satisfying pleasures than her rival (2.1.33, cf. 
2.1.30).  In his discussion with Antiphon and also in Xenophon’s Symposium, 
Socrates similarly makes a case for a life which integrates properly an appreciation of 
physical beauty with moral virtue, while noting that there is an alternative and 
altogether less edifying reaction that is all too possible.   
Before we move on, there is one further text to consider.  It is tempting to 
think that the outward glow of beauty is a necessary concomitant of a young man’s 
being in his prime such that all such young men in their prime will necessarily display 
this further aspect of a kind of blooming appearance.  However, there is a Platonic 
text that Aristotle knew very well which suggests that the connection might often be 
much less strict.  Although the bloom of youth comes only to those that are in their 
prime, it is apparently possible for someone to be in their prime but not display this 
bloom of youth.  At Plato Republic 601b, Socrates is considering poetry.  A poet, he 
argues, adorns his account of cobbling or generalship or some other activity with 
metre, rhythm, and harmony.  But when his poetry is stripped of these elements, the 
words that remain are ‘like the faces of men who are youthful (ὡραῖοι) but not really 
beautiful, when the bloom of youth (τὸ ἄνθος) abandons them’.10  Of course, the 
terminology is different from that chosen by Aristotle and, in particular, Socrates 
seems to use the term ὡραῖοι as a synonym for Aristotle’s ἀκμαίοι and finds another 
                                                          
10
  Plato Rep. 601b6–7: ἔοικεν τοῖς τῶν ὡραίων προσώποις, καλῶν δὲ μή, οἷα γίγνεται ἰδεῖν ὅταν 
αὐτὰ τὸ ἄνθος προλίπῃ.  
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term, ἄνθος, for the perceptible beauty.11  But what does seem clear from Socrates’ 
account is that this bloom is something relatively fleeting, being visible only for a 
short period when the young man is at a particular stage of his growing maturity and 
perhaps only for a brief period of one’s already brief youth.  This part of the Republic 
and this specific account of the allure of poetic form is certainly a text that Aristotle 
knows well because he refers to it in his discussion of similes at Rhet. 3.3.
12
  In terms 
of the relationship between pleasure and activity, the claim that there are young men 
who nevertheless display this bloom only for a brief period would imply that the 
simple presence of the underlying disposition is not sufficient for this completion but 
that the completion comes about only under certain ideal circumstances.  Aristotle 
himself, of course, has some clear views on what, for example, constitute the ideal 
objects of the activity of seeing and the ideal circumstances of engaging in the 
activities from which pleasures arise and makes those clear immediately prior to using 
the image of the bloom of youth.
13
  
 
Hōra, pleasure, and virtue 
 
We can also find similar connotations of the notion of the bloom of youth elsewhere 
in the Nicomachean Ethics.  At NE 8.4 1156b35–1157a12, Aristotle contrasts the 
virtuous kind of friendship (philia) with other kinds. The virtuous form of friendship, 
he insists, is much more stable and lasting than the others because each member of the 
relationship receives the same things from the other partner.  He then explains how 
this is not always the case for friendships founded on pleasure. 
                                                          
11
  Bostock (2000) 156–8 argues that, if hōraios is understood more or less as a synonym for 
akmaios, it is likely that we should read the relationship between pleasure and activity in 
Aristotle’s simile as an analogue for the relationship between, for example, health and a 
healthy body.  He further argues that this interpretation minimizes the temptation to think of 
pleasure in Aristotle’s view as something extra and in addition to the activity and therefore 
also minimizes the possibility of an inconsistency between the account of pleasure in book 10 
and book 7 (esp. 1153a12–15). 
12
  Arist. Rhet. 1406b36–a2: καὶ ἡ εἰς τὰ μέτρα τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅτι ἔοικε τοῖς ἄνευ κάλλους 
ὡραίοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπανθήσαντες, τὰ δὲ διαλυθέντα οὐχ ὅμοια φαίνεται. 
13
  See NE 10.4 1174b14–20 and 1174b28–31. 
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ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς 
ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι 
ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι μένουσιν, 
ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται παρ’ ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον 
οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς 
ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδονται οὗτοι, ἀλλ’ ὃ 
μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκεῖνον, ὃ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης 
δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ 
ὄψις, τῷ δ’ οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία)· πολλοὶ δ’ αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ 
τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες. 
 
Friendship based on pleasure is similar to this one [sc. friendship 
based on virtue] for good men also are pleasing to one another.  (It 
is similarly the case for friendship based on what is useful, because 
good men are also useful to one another.)  Friendships last 
especially in those cases when the same thing is shared between 
them, such as pleasure, but not just that: also pleasure from the same 
thing, for example as in the case of witty people and not in the case 
of a lover and beloved.  For these last two do not take pleasure in 
the same things, but the former in seeing the latter, the latter in 
being cultivated by the lover.  And sometimes when the bloom of 
youth fades (ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας) so too does the friendship for 
the appearance is no longer pleasant to the lover and the beloved is 
no longer cultivated.  But many do remain friends, provided as a 
result of familiarity they enjoy each other’s character, now that they 
have become alike. 
Some examples of pleasure friendships are like those based on good character.  For 
example, friendships based on pleasure can be as stable as friendships based on virtue, 
provided that the two members continue to take pleasure in the same things.  When 
two witty people are friends with one another, this might be a stable form of 
friendship even though it is based on pleasure, because both members of the pair 
enjoy the same thing: the other’s wit.  (Virtuous people will take pleasure in the same 
things and so a virtuous friendship will also involve many experiences of pleasure, 
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even though pleasure is not the grounds of the friendship.)  Significantly, Aristotle 
contrasts such a stable friendship based on pleasure with the case of a relationship 
between an older lover and a younger beloved since, in the latter case, Aristotle says 
that although both members of the pair may take pleasure from the relationship, their 
pleasures come from different sources.
14
  The older lover takes pleasure in seeing his 
beloved, whereas the beloved takes pleasure in being cared for and being cultivated 
by his lover.  Furthermore, Aristotle insists that such erotic relationships are 
temporary since they depend on a particular and transitory youthful beauty.   
At 1157a8, when describing the youthful beauty of the beloved, Aristotle uses 
the same word—ὥρα—as he does to illustrate the relationship between pleasure and 
activity at NE 10.4 1174b33.  In the passage from book eight he is clearly describing a 
relationship between an erastēs and an erōmenos and the reference to the beauty of 
the latter fading suggests very strongly that it is to be associated with a temporary 
phase during adolescence at which the young man is at some kind of peak of 
attractiveness.   
Yet in book eight Aristotle is not drawing an analogy between beauty and 
pleasure; rather, he is interested in showing how in this situation the beauty of the 
young man can also be a cause of a certain kind of pleasure.  In his analysis of the 
philia between lover and beloved, Aristotle points out that when the beauty disappears 
so does the lover’s pleasure in viewing the beloved and when the lover no longer 
offers the same kind of attention to the beloved then the beloved’s pleasure from the 
relationship also ceases.  He notes elsewhere that sight is a source of great pleasure 
between lovers and wonders if it is often the primary reason why an erotic 
relationship first arises and is then sustained (1171b29–32, cf. 1167a3–7).15  This role 
of the pleasant vision of the beloved as the provocation to a relationship is then taken 
up once more in Aristotle’s explanation of why such relationships end.  Often, when 
youthful beauty fades, since the relationship is grounded on the respective pleasures 
each takes, so too does the relationship itself fade unless it has been replaced by a 
                                                          
14
  Contrast cases in which only one partner takes pleasure in the relationship while the other is 
interested in its utility: 1164a2–13.  Cf. Price (1989) 243–49. 
15
  Cf. Price (1989) 241–3; Sihvola (2002) 211. 
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more lasting tie based on familiarity (1157a10–12).16  In particular, since the lover’s 
pleasure is generated by the perception of the beloved’s youthful beauty, when this 
beauty fades then so does the pleasure and, in turn, the friendship which takes that 
pleasure as its basis.  This type of friendship then contrasts with another kind of erotic 
relationship in which the two partners exchange favors of utility rather than pleasure 
(a12–14).17  This final form of relationship is most unstable because, as Aristotle 
curtly notes, the two are not philoi of one another but only of the gain each might take 
from the relationship.  Once that opportunity has disappeared, so too has the 
relationship.  The grounds of the friendship are unstable and, like the friendship based 
on pleasure, so too is the friendship itself. 
 When Aristotle wrote this he can hardly have been unaware of an obvious 
Platonic antecedent of his discussion of the differences between, on the one hand, the 
exchange of pleasures between lover and beloved and, on the other hand, a 
relationship more focused on character and perhaps even virtue.  The most obvious 
antecedent for Aristotle’s account of this form of philia is Pausanias’ speech in Plato’s 
Symposium, particularly 183d8–e6.  Here, as at Republic 601b, the preferred term 
appears to be ἄνθος rather than ὥρα—the term found in Xenophon and Aristotle—but 
the sense is evidently the same: 
πονηρὸς δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐραστὴς ὁ πάνδημος, ὁ τοῦ σώματος 
μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ μόνιμός ἐστιν, ἅτε οὐ 
μονίμου ἐρῶν πράγματος. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι, 
οὗπερ ἤρα, οἴχεται ἀποπτάμενος, πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ ὑποσχέσεις 
                                                          
16
  Pakaluk (1998) 79 insists that this is the right interpretation of Aristotle’s point and rejects an 
alternative view (supported by Price (1989) 247–8 and Pangle (2003) 41) that the friendship 
becomes one based on virtuous character.  That alternative, as Price points out, would seem to 
make Aristotle’s view on this occasion rather closer to some Platonic texts. 
17
  Pakaluk (1998) 78–80, interprets the case at a12–14 (his case (4)) as one in which one partner 
offers what is useful in return for pleasure from the other partner.  While this is clearly a 
plausible form of erotic philia and perhaps a common way for Aristotle’s contemporaries to 
imagine the relationship, it appears that here Aristotle is denying that pleasure is the basis for 
either of the ties between the pair.  ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι at a12 suggests that whatever is 
being exchanged is reciprocated in kind. 
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καταισχύνας· ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἤθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἐραστὴς διὰ βίου μένει, 
ἅ τε μονίμῳ συντακείς. 
 
It is the common, vulgar, lover who loves the body rather than the 
soul, the man whose love is bound to be inconstant since what he 
loves is itself mutable and unstable.  The moment the body is no 
longer in bloom (ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι), ‘he flies 
off and away’, his promises and vows in tatters behind him.  How 
different from this is a man who loves the right sort of character, 
and who remains its lover for life, attached as he is to something 
permanent. (trans. A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff) 
The love of the worse kind of erastēs, therefore, is indeed a fleeting and unstable 
thing because it is focused upon something which is itself not lasting.  It should be 
compared unfavorably with the lover who is focused on the stable and good character 
of the beloved.  Indeed, the worse kind of love is necessarily temporary since the 
particular bloom of youth whose beauty on which it is based is present only for a 
fleeting period in the development of the young man.  This is evidently something of 
a common trope in discussions of this kind of relationship.  In the encomium of the 
non-lover at Phaedrus 232e3–6, Lysias’ speech explains how a lover tends to desire 
the beloved physically in advance of any knowledge of the beloved’s character.  In 
that case there is good reason for even the lover himself to be unsure whether the 
relationship will last once the desire has passed, which presumably is to be understood 
as a suspicion that a decline in the lover’s ardor might be caused by a gradual decline 
in the particular youthful physical beauty of the beloved as he ages. 
 
Plato Philebus 53d–e 
 
The evidence offered so far should provide sufficient reason to think that the choice of 
the image in NE 10.4 is guided at least in part by a relatively extensive theme in 
Socratic texts.
18
  These texts discuss the relationship between pleasure and virtue by 
                                                          
18
  While I concentrate on the background to Aristotle’s remarks, it is evident that this general 
theme was also prominent in philosophy after Aristotle. The Stoics’ account of erōs defines it 
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considering homosexual relationships between a young and beautiful beloved and an 
older lover.  The visual appearance of the beloved is agreed to be a cause of and 
incitement to pleasure but thinking about the initial grounds and possible development 
of such a relationship between two men allows Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle 
himself to explore further the differences between relationships based merely on 
pleasure and those based on an appreciation and cultivation of good character.  
Aristotle’s choice of an image taken from discussions of erotic youthful beauty is 
justified in part because, as the passages from Xenophon and Aristotle’s own 
discussion of philia show, there are already strong connotations of this youthful 
perceptual beauty being an object of or temptation to pleasure and, moreover, there is 
a long-running awareness that there is a potentially fraught relationship between 
pleasing beauty of this kind and virtuous behavior.   
 But we noted at the outset that Aristotle is trying to illustrate a metaphysical 
claim about the nature of pleasure and its relationship to activity.  And here too there 
is an important Platonic text which Aristotle and his audience should have in mind 
which also deals with pleasure by reference to relationships between erastai and 
erōmenoi.  The general disagreement between Aristotle and Plato on the correct 
analysis of the nature of pleasure is clear enough and is introduced succinctly at 10.3 
1173a29–31 by Aristotle himself. 19   A strong common thread between the two 
discussions of pleasure in NE 7 (see e.g. 7.12 1152b12–15 and 1153a7–15) and NE 10 
is that Aristotle takes issue with any analysis of pleasure which categorizes it as 
always some kind of change (kinēsis) or coming-to-be (genesis).  Since someone 
might conclude that if pleasure is a kinēsis then it cannot itself be a good, Aristotle 
seeks to remove this obstacle to the acceptance of at least some pleasures as good by 
correcting the analysis of the nature of pleasure on which it is based.  That correction 
involves insisting that pleasure is to be associated with activities and goals rather than 
                                                                                                                                                                      
as the pursuit of the apparent beauty of a young man in bloom (τὸν δ’ ἔρωτά φασιν ἐπιβολὴν 
εἶναι φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον νέων ὡραίων: Arius Didymus ap. Stob. 2.115.1–
2W = SVF 3.650); cf. Schofield (1991) 28–42 and Price (2002) 183–91. 
19
  There is a good discussion in Taylor (2003). 
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changes or comings-to-be.
20
  Although the notion that pleasure is a kinēsis or genesis 
of some kind is in all likelihood neither an innovation on Plato’s part nor is it a thesis 
which Aristotle would have associated with Plato alone, the distinction between a 
kinēsis or genesis and something else, namely the goal or end-point of the change, 
plays a significant role in Plato’s most elaborate discussion of the nature of pleasure 
in the Philebus.  And in the Philebus too there is a discussion of pleasure that 
illustrates what Socrates thinks is the correct metaphysical account of the nature of 
pleasure by means of an analogy with the relationship between an erastēs and a 
beautiful erōmenos.   
 In his discussion of the nature of pleasure at Philebus at 53d–e, Socrates tries 
to make clear the correct general metaphysical classification of pleasure.  Socrates 
outlines a general two-fold distinction between things that are ‘themselves by 
themselves’ (auta kath’ hauta) and those that are always ‘aiming at’ something else.  
In presenting this distinction, Socrates is trying to explain to Protarchus the argument 
which he has just—at 53c4–7—ascribed to a group of clever people (kompsoi).  These 
people argue that pleasure is not to be counted among goods because it belongs not in 
the class of ‘beings’ (ousiai) but of ‘becomings’ (geneseis).    In order to make his 
account clearer, Socrates makes various attempts at elucidating this general division 
of things including a distinction between things that are ‘themselves by themselves’ 
and those that ‘aim at something else’.  For example, Socrates considers the example 
of ship-building and ships.  A ship is an example of an ousia, something that is ‘itself 
by itself’; presumably, the notion is that it is complete and in so far as it is a ship it 
requires nothing additional beyond itself.  Ship-building, on the other hand, is what it 
is precisely because it aims at something else: the being of a ship.  Were there not this 
goal at the end of the process of ship-building, the process would not be a process of 
ship-building at all.  We might object that without processes of ship-building there 
would be no ships either, but Socrates is not interested in this kind of causal 
                                                          
20
  On the relationship of this passage to the discussion of the energeia–kinēsis distinction found 
in Met. Θ.6, see Burnyeat (2008) 265–79. 
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dependence but rather in the claim that the nature of the process is dependent on the 
nature of the end or goal.
21
   
 More interesting, however, is Socrates’ first example. 22   The very first 
example of the ousia-genesis contrast, at 53d9–10, is the relationship between a 
younger, beautiful, male beloved and his older male lover.  Here is the example in its 
immediate context (53d3–e1): 
Soc.: Let there be this pair: what is itself, by itself, and what is 
always aiming at something else (τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό, τὸ δ’ 
ἀεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου). 
Prot.: What are these two you are talking about and what are they 
like? 
Soc.: The one is always by nature most holy (σεμνότατον) and the 
other is deficient. 
Prot.: Be clearer still, please. 
Soc.: I suppose we have seen beautiful and good young boys 
together with their brave lovers (παιδικά που καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ 
τεθεωρήκαμεν ἅμα καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν). 
Prot.: Certainly. 
Soc.: Then now look for another pair of things that are like these 
two in all the ways we are mentioning. 
Protarchus clearly finds Socrates’ point hard to grasp.  But if the shipbuilding–ship 
example is an alternative way of making the same point, then here too Socrates is 
attempting to use the example of such a relationship to outline a very general 
classification of things into those which are for the sake of something else and those 
for whose sake other things are.  Protarchus, like most modern readers, finds the 
shipbuilding–ship example far more helpful (σαφέστατα 54c5) than Socrates’ initial 
analogy of the beloved and his lover, but it is worth remarking that Socrates turned 
                                                          
21
  Socrates also seems not to consider, or at least not to think it worth mentioning, the possibility 
that something might be both for the sake of something and something for the sake of which 
something else is.  The general point of the passage is nevertheless clear enough for our 
purposes.   
22
  There is a good discussion of this passage in Evans (2007). 
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first of all to an analogy from male homosexual relations and only when pressed for 
further clarification moved to something more easily grasped.  We have, in other 
words, no reason to think that there cannot be a similar exposition of Socrates’ first 
choice of analogy and some reason to think that this might in fact be Socrates’ 
preferred example.   
Socrates seems prepared to argue that the pairs of items he wants to outline as 
analogous are analogous ’in all the ways mentioned’.  By this he must mean that the 
pairs are analogous to one another in so far as one member of each pair is (1) ‘what it 
is itself, by itself’ and (2) ‘most holy’, while the other has characteristics which 
contrast with each of these since it is (1*) ‘always aiming at something else’ and (2*) 
‘deficient’.  Just after this section, at 54c, Socrates adds a further contrast: one 
member of the pair is (3) ‘that for the sake of which each of the things that comes-to-
be comes-to-be’ and the other member is (3*) ‘always for the sake of something’ 
(53e5–7).  So, although Protarchus finds it difficult to understand Socrates’ point, at 
least initially, the analogy seems to demand that it is the young beloved who is (1) 
‘what is itself, by itself’, (2) ‘most holy’, and (3) ‘that for the sake of which what 
comes-to-be comes-to-be’, while the older lover is (1*) ‘always aiming at something 
else’, (2*) ‘deficient’, and (3*) ‘for the sake of something else’.23 
Before we consider just how such an erotic relationship might us help to 
understand the metaphysics of pleasure, let us note at the outset that there is at the 
very least a prima facie case for thinking that Aristotle’s comment in NE 10.4 is in 
some way related to Socrates’ comment here in the Philebus.  Not only do both texts 
reach for a comparison rooted in the language of homosexual courtship for their 
explanation of the nature of pleasure, but also those two explanations of the nature of 
pleasure are themselves engaging in a clear dialogue with one another.  The 
                                                          
23
  Cf. Delcomminette (2006) 494–5: ‘Il convient de garder constamment cette série de couples à 
l’esprit, car elle suffit par elle-même à réfuter l’une des interprétations dominantes de ce 
passage, qui y voit la simple distinction entre moyen et fin.  En effet, une telle interprétation 
ne permet pas de rendre compte du couple de l’amant et de l’aimé, par exemple.  Ce qui se 
joue ici est bien plutôt la distinction entre le désir et son objet, ou plus généralement et plus 
exactement, entre ce qui, étant en état de manque, tend toujours vers autre chose, à savoir 
l’état dans lequel ce manque serait comblé, et ce qui n’a plus de manque, mais se suffit à lui-
même.’ 
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metaphysical classification of pleasures expounded by the kompsoi and elucidated by 
this analogy in the Philebus is precisely what Aristotle is arguing against in NE 10.3–
4.  As he says at 1174b9–10: ‘From these considerations it is clear also that they do 
not correctly describe pleasure as a change (kinēsis) or a coming-to-be (genesis)’.  
The people he refers to here as holding this mistaken view are not exclusively the 
kompsoi of the Philebus, but the kompsoi are surely included in the group he wants to 
oppose and this section of the Philebus will in all likelihood have been the most 
prominent and explicit statement of this thesis.
24
   
 
The erastēs, beauty, and pleasure 
 
Now let us try to explain the lover–beloved relationship in the same way that Socrates 
himself explains the relationship between ship-building and a ship in the following 
section of the text (54b2ff.)  There, it is clear that the practice of ship-building aims at 
some goal or end—the ship—and moreover is guided throughout by that goal or end 
in terms of the selection of materials, tools, and the order in which the process 
unfolds.  And it is also clear that a given process of ship-building will be evaluated in 
the light of the eventual ship that results; whatever value it has is dependent on the 
value of the product at which it aims.  When Socrates finally explains the ousia–
genesis distinction in terms of the value of the members of the two classes, he insists 
that ‘that for the sake of which something comes to be’ should be put in the class 
(moira) of goods while pleasure, if it is a kind of coming-to-be, ought to be placed in 
a different class and is therefore not a good (54c9–d3). 
 The relationship of beloved to lover or erōmenos to erastēs is meant to be an 
analogue of that of ousia to genesis.  Most importantly, it is the lover who is aligned 
with pleasure and ‘becoming’ while the beloved is aligned with a completion or goal 
and with ‘being’.  Our confidence that this is the correct way to understand the 
analogy can be supported by a variety of notions which build on a common, albeit 
perhaps idealised, picture of the lover–beloved relationship and also various 
                                                          
24
  True, the Philebus puts the contrast in terms of genesis and not kinēsis; but Aristotle uses the 
latter legitimately to allow him to make the point clearer in terms of his favoured contrast.  He 
seems to understand the two (genesis and kinēsis) to be more or less interchangeable in the 
sense relevant for the present discussion (see e.g. 1174b9–10). 
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conceptions of the lover–beloved relationship which can be found either in the 
surrounding context of the Philebus or elsewhere in Platonic texts.
25
  Generally 
speaking, it is the beloved and not the lover who is described in terms which refer to 
his beauty and goodness.  And it is the beloved who is the goal at which the lover 
aims.  It is ‘for the sake of’ the beloved that the lover undertakes various tasks, 
performs various acts and so on.  Furthermore, it is the lover, and not the beloved, 
who feels desire.  In addition, desire is often explained as involving a lack or absence.  
So in this sense, qua lover he is lacking.  Lack or deficiency is a characteristic of the 
class of things that are geneseis (54e4–8) and is made a defining feature of the lover 
by Plato most obviously in the Symposium (see e.g. Socrates’ exchange with Agathon 
at 200e–201c and then Socrates’ exchange with Diotima at 201e–206c). 
  There is a further association between Socrates’ analogy and the notion of the 
metaphysics of pleasure he is trying to explain.  Whatever the reality of the matter, 
some Platonic accounts promote the idea that it is the lover and not the beloved who 
takes pleasure in the relationship.
26
  Consider, for example, Phaedrus 240c6–d4: ‘The 
older man stays with the younger day and night and will not leave him willingly, but 
he is driven by necessity and a goad that urges him on even as it gives pleasure to him 
to see, hear, touch, and take in the beloved with every sense so that he accompanies 
him like a servant, with pleasure’.  To be sure, the context here is a speech in which 
the aim is to persuade the young man that he is better off taking up with someone who 
is not his lover, but the rhetorical tropes must be to some extent plausible to a general 
Athenian audience for the speech to be effective.  And one of those tropes is 
undoubtedly the notion that the lover, despite—or perhaps because of—the oddly 
subservient position in which he is placed by the perceptible beauty of the young 
beloved, will take pleasure in the sight, sound and feel of the object of his desire.  
That this is a central motif in depictions of such relationships might even be 
confirmed by the fact that Socrates continues to deploy it in the palinode which 
praises love and the beneficial effects it has on the soul of a good lover.  Here, when 
the lover glimpses the beauty of the beloved, he might—if he has not been properly 
initiated—surrender to physical pleasure and incorrectly emphasize the bestial part of 
                                                          
25
  Cf. Frede (1997) 311–12. 
26
  There are exceptions to this general picture in the sources, but they tend to be marked as 
grotesque departures from the norm.  See the lengthy discussion in Davidson (2007) 38–67. 
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his nature (250e).  But the more enlightened lover will react to the same beauty 
differently because he will see in the physical beauty a reflection of pure intelligible 
beauty.  Nevertheless, this lover too will take great pleasure in an association with the 
beloved.  As the lover takes in the flow of beauty, the pain caused by the initial 
growth of the lover’s wings subsides and is replaced by pleasure (251c5–d1) and 
Socrates insists throughout that the vision of the beloved’s beauty will be a source of 
the sweetest pleasure to the lover (251e3–252a1). 
 All in all, at Philebus 53d–e, Socrates is expecting Protarchus to agree that, 
having considered the erastēs—erōmenos relationship as an illustrative analogue, 
pleasure should be assigned to the category in which also belong those other things, 
brave lovers included, that are deficient or for the sake of some further goal.  The 
beautiful beloved, on the other hand, belongs in the category of items for whose sake 
other things are.  The direct association in other contexts of the lover rather than the 
beloved with erotic pleasure further cements Socrates’ intended message. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In all the passages we have surveyed, the pleasure that the lover experiences as a 
result of the erotic partnership is associated with a desire for the beloved and, more 
specifically, is related to the visible and youthful beauty of the beloved.  The pleasure 
is usually imagined as being caused by a desire that is generated by perceiving the 
beloved’s beauty.  Since that physical beauty is not long-lasting, neither is the 
pleasure the lover receives because of it and the relationship itself will either cease 
once the beauty fades away or else it will have developed into a relationship based on 
a desire for or appreciation of some other facet of the partner, perhaps a more lasting 
and stable facet that will ground a more lasting tie of friendship or—in those Platonic 
texts which tie the power of erotic attraction to beauty to a specific ontological 
view—the appreciation of a stable and general, perhaps solely intelligible, kind of 
beauty.  It is clear, in that case, why Socrates in the Philebus likens pleasure to the 
lover and not the beloved, since he wants to categorize pleasure as a coming-to-be and 
as something temporary and incomplete on the grounds that it looks for its fulfilment 
in some object for whose sake it comes-to-be and which is its goal.   
 Aristotle too may have been thinking of how this is the most beautiful 
appearance a young man will have since he has also been discussing how the pleasure 
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of seeing increases when the activity of seeing is engaged to the highest degree and 
that this requires a beautiful object (10.4 1174b14–19).27   But the image he chooses 
in NE 10.4 also makes a point about the metaphysical nature of pleasure by casting 
pleasure as the analogue of this very bloom of beauty rather than a product of the 
desire the beauty inspires in the lover.  Indeed, in Aristotle’s preferred account 
pleasure stands to an activity as the bloom of beauty stands to the young beloved 
himself at this particular stage of his life.  Clearly, this is meant to point to a sense in 
which pleasure and activity are intimately related: they are ‘yoked together and cannot 
be separated’ (10.4 1175a19–20).  Activity is not the cause of a pleasure in the way 
that the beauty of the beloved functioned as a cause of the lover’s pleasure in 
Socrates’ analogy in the Philebus.  Instead, we ought to conceive of the relationship 
between pleasure and activity differently.  Nevertheless, despite wanting to correct the 
prevalent understanding of the nature of pleasure and its relationship to change and 
activity, Aristotle wants to capture and illustrate his own account of this relationship 
by reaching again for the familiar source of explanatory material in this kind of 
discussion.  Most importantly, by shifting our focus of attention away from the lover 
and towards the beloved, Aristotle will encourage us to think of pleasure not in 
connection with a deficient or incomplete change, coming-to-be, or desire but rather 
towards a something that is complete, an object of desire, and a goal.  Aristotle invites 
us to think that pleasure should be associated not with the incomplete or unsatisfied 
desire of the lover but rather with the completion and perfection of the young man: the 
manifest beautiful bloom of youth.   
 There remains, of course, the tricky business of trying to understand the 
precise nature of the relationship between pleasure and activity that Aristotle has in 
mind, in particular the precise relationship between the ‘underlying disposition’ and 
the ‘supervening end’.28  It is not my aim here to settle those difficult questions but 
this consideration of the philosophical and literary background to Aristotle’s choice of 
analogy ought to cast some light on the precise nature of that relationship.  We can 
certainly outline some of the ways in which it might do so.  For example, it is clear 
that the connection between the bloom of youth and the underlying physical 
                                                          
27  See Warren (2014) 60–64. 
28
  On which, see for example Bostock (1988), Gonzalez (1991), Heinaman (2011), Shields 
(2011), and Strohl (2011). 
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disposition of the young man in his prime is extremely close, so close that it might be 
difficult sometimes to distinguish one from the other.  Nevertheless, there is an 
important distinction to be drawn between the visible beauty of a young man— itself 
the cause of much pleasure and desire—and the underlying state of the young man.  
So too, Aristotle notes that the connection between an activity (energeia) and the 
supervenient pleasure is also very close; it is so close, in fact, that some people have 
mistakenly identified the activity of perception, for example, with the pleasure of 
perceiving (1175b34–6).  That underlying state of the young man, furthermore, is 
explanatorily prior to the perceptible ‘bloom’ just as the underlying activity is 
explanatorily prior to the pleasure that supervenes on it.  A similar relation of priority 
holds between the activity and pleasure.   
Finally, the implication of the analogy is that the bloom of youth is the 
perceptible manifestation of the young man’s being at the very peak of physical 
desirability, a state that may last only for a short while, and that this bloom somehow 
completes or perfects that underlying state.  How does it do that?  Consideration of 
other texts that use the term shows that this ‘bloom’ is the outward sign and 
perceptible manifestation of the young male’s being at the peak of his physical 
development.  Although dependent on the underlying excellent physical state, the 
bloom of youth is not identical to it.  Rather, the bloom of youth is what declares the 
value of that state to the erastēs.  Similarly, perhaps, although pleasure is dependent 
on and caused by the underlying activity, it too declares the positive value of that 
activity. 
Regardless of the various interpretative problems that remain, it should be 
clear, nevertheless, that Aristotle certainly uses this otherwise puzzling comparison to 
reach back to a set of illustrative connections between pleasure, beauty, virtue, and 
desire that would have been very familiar to his audience because, in particular, it had 
been used regularly in related philosophical discussions in Socratic texts including 
Plato’s Philebus.  The subtle reuse of a familiar Socratic motif that had previously 
been deployed in a text that set out to defend the idea that pleasure is a genesis 
presents in a very compact form the essentials of Aristotle’s attempt to correct the 
Platonic account: pleasure belongs first and foremost with the perfect and complete 
 22 
activity and not, as Socrates maintained in the Philebus, with the change or process 
that leads up to it.
29
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